




Joining the dots and making sense of the key geopolitical developments in Europe, Eurasia and MENA

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Geopolitical Trends (Re-)Emerging from the return of Donald Trump at the White House:

Key points:

1. How the emerging outcomes of war in Ukraine are reshaping European security.
 2. President Trump's (re-)vision of the world order: transactional hardline Realpolitik?
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On November 5, 2024, Donald Trump was elected as the 47th President of the United States of America. On January 20th, 2025, he has returned to the White House with an agenda which has rapidly stunned the world. In his first 50 days, president Trump pursued vigorously the foreign and security policy tenets announced, but only partly implemented, during his first tenure at the White House (2017-2020): the U.S. global leadership promoted by his predecessors was not cost-effective for America; the system of alliances and partnerships just burdened the American budget and failed to provide the same strategic, economic, and geopolitical output they used to throughout the second half of the 20th century; multilateralism and international organizations and agreements uselessly constrained American power, and implicitly its freedom to exert it at the global and regional levels; issue-oriented, *ad-hoc*, temporary arrangements were more profitable in meeting U.S. national interests; there were a number of states, including allies and partners, but also adversaries, who took unfair

advantage of American benign hegemony in the post-Cold War era, and they should be powerfully pushed back. (<https://geopoliticalfutures.com>).

Very recently, he added to his MAGA agenda fresh hints to the possible annexation of Canada and Greenland and has taken steps towards a potentially highly consequential détente with Russia. Against this backdrop and having in mind the ongoing structural changes of the world order over the last decades, this issue focuses on geopolitical trends (re-)emerging from D. Trump's return to the White House.

1) How the emerging outcomes of war in Ukraine are reshaping European security.

As explained in [Issue 24/ November 2023- February 2024](#), Item #1, "Europe is facing a crucial security dilemma ensuing from its higher military dependence on the US, distrust of Russia, and reluctance to negotiate on building a new European security architecture: it should either escalate the war with Russia or lose (at least much of) Ukraine at its own peril. Such evolutions could portend a fresh crisis in

European affairs". Such a crisis was triggered in mid-February 2025 by vice-president's J.D. Vance speech at the Munich Security Conference, and it has turned into panic by the news that a US high-level delegation, headed by state secretary, M. Rubio, and National Security Advisor, M. Waltz, would meet senior Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to negotiate a "peace deal" on Ukraine in the absence of Ukrainian and European representatives. That was the case since upending US policy against Russia created a strong feeling "that the international order, which the US and Europe had built together during eight decades of joint action, was simply unravelling". (A. Polyakova on <https://cepa.org>)

J. Fleck and J. Batchik outlined why the apparent sidelining of the Europeans in US negotiations with Russia on ending the war in Ukraine was a disaster for Europe: 1) the forced capitulation of Ukraine would likely spark another wave of refugees flooding the EU; 2) Europe would also lose an important partner for critical materials and trade; 3) Europeans would have to contend with an emboldened, increasingly revisionist Russia on its doorstep; 4) it would be a depressing rejoinder to EU's geopolitical ambitions. Who would take Europe seriously in global affairs if it could not have a role in the security of its own continent? (<https://atlanticcouncil.org>)

The Europeans expected to be asked to provide forces and capabilities to a military operation aiming to enforce/guarantee a potential ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. In London, British Prime Minister K. Starmer said on March 2, that European, Canadian and Ukrainian leaders had agreed on four points: 1) Europe would continue to send military assistance to Kyiv while increasing sanctions pressure on Moscow; 2) a peace settlement had to be negotiated with Ukraine at the table and ensure its sovereignty and security; 3) as a settlement took hold, Europe would work with Ukraine to bolster its defensive capabilities; 4) a European "coalition of the

willing" should back up a settlement by deploying troops in Ukraine. However, the European leaders had counted on the US to provide a backstop in case the situation in the field turned ugly and the European forces would have been caught under Russian fire. However, American officials rejected undertaking any responsibility in guaranteeing peace, while president V. Putin made it clear that European forces were not welcome as guarantors of peace in Ukraine under any flag (EU, NATO or national). This double "No/ Niet" to European plans to play a meaningful role in upholding a peace settlement under theirs' (and Ukrainian) terms, for what they would see as a just, lasting peace, has further deepened the current crisis in European affairs.

In these circumstances, the worst-case scenario might involve the White House and the Kremlin agreeing on a deal that would largely favour Russia and effectively impair Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. Such a deal would rewrite Europe's security architecture by ending NATO's open-door policy and forcing territorial concessions on Ukraine without security guarantees that would effectively deter Russia for the long-term. Its ensuing risks could entail a firm rejection by Kyiv and most of European capitals, president D. Trump blaming the failure on them and deciding US' *de facto*, if not *de jure*, withdrawal from European military and security affairs, while leaving the Europeans highly vulnerable to future potential Russian aggression, in particular the EU's Eastern members, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland and Romania.

As A. Palacio put it: "Europe finds itself at a critical moment. But unlike in 1941, there is no Churchill. There is no voice capable of articulating a clear project. The European Union wavers between technocracy and political impotence. The war in Ukraine has tested its leadership, and the result is, at best, ambivalent. There has been unity in sanctions

on Russia, as well as in military support and backing for Kyiv. But a vision for the future is missing.” (<https://atlanticcouncil.org>)

How could the Europeans best handle the current crisis in European affairs against the looming end of the geopolitical West?

In a recent piece on “The Case for Europe”, R. Balfour described the current crisis in European affairs as a choice between two scenarios: *“At best, Europe will have to defend its territory alone and take responsibility for deterrence. At worst, it will have to fend off great powers actively seeking to subvert it as they assert their respective spheres of influence. This could involve political interference, economic coercion, and open aggression, tearing Europe apart. Europe’s choice lies in between these two scenarios.”* (<https://carnegieendowment.org>)

From this grim perspective, probably the most urgent task for a New Europe, aligning EU’s, UK’s and Turkiye’s European security and defence outlooks, would be to prevent turning the current rift with president D. Trump’s policy on Ukraine into a broader breakdown of the Trans-Atlantic relations with potentially dramatic implications for the future of NATO, EU, and EU-US relations. To that end, the best they could do, in the short-term, is to follow US lead towards a ceasefire in Ukraine on the most realistically possible terms, but short of the unrealistic *“peace through strength”* mantra. The point is that they should live with the fact that, over the short-term, Europeans couldn’t fully replace US military capabilities deployed in support of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and that continued hostility against Russia was self-defeating. The time is currently running in favour of Moscow, and the longer the delay in stopping the hostilities, the weaker the Ukrainian positions in the negotiations will be. There is no wonder that the Kremlin, fully aware of the current Russian military superiority on the frontline, and its new-found geopolitical leverage to support some US foreign policy priorities has

attempted to take full advantage of both of them. And the current disagreement of US and European policies on Ukraine is playing well in president V. Putin’s hands while offering him a safe cover for *“dragging his feet”* in moving towards a ceasefire on the back of European apparent hostility against Russia. His aim might be to wear down the patience of president D. Trump for bringing peace to Ukraine, while accelerating the worst-case scenario where the latter might decide to suspend the US involvement in European military and security affairs.

In parallel, the Europeans, including interested post-Soviet states, (gathered around New Europe, consisting of the EU, UK, and Turkiye) should start thinking seriously about how the European security system could be adjusted to match the shifting global and regional balances of power. In addition, the EU members must come to terms with their looming strategic autonomy in European affairs. They should urgently upgrade military capabilities and strive putting together the building blocks of a new European security architecture. That would be the best way to ensure long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.

In January 2025, G. Beebe argued in an article on *“Trump may get Russia and Ukraine to the table. Then what?”* that president D. Trump should *“revive a tradition of American statesmanship, i.e. balancing power and interests among capable rivals to achieve an accord that Ukraine will embrace, Russia will respect, and Europe will support”*. To that end, after bringing Russia and Ukraine at the negotiations table (happening at the time of writing), the US mediators should work to re-set the balance of power in Europe; leverage US wider ability to shape European security; adjust the outcomes of the war to Ukraine’s, and European states’ vital interests; and engage China in persuading Russia to agree on a deal. In that vein, he noted that for Russia, the war in Ukraine was a key theatre in a larger geopolitical conflict with the US. Moscow’s primary goals have

been to block Ukraine's membership in NATO, as well as to prevent a US military presence in Ukraine that would threaten Russian security. Beebe further claimed that even capturing all of Ukraine would not resolve Russia's larger security problems with NATO, including US intermediate-range missiles for which it had no effective countermeasures. He thought that these larger security issues could provide the US with leverage to end the war while protecting core Western and Ukrainian interests — including a secure path toward Ukrainian membership in the EU. (<https://responsiblestatecraft.org>) That is another key reason why New Europe should keep itself aligned with Washington, whether it agreed or not with president D. Trump's negotiation methods.

According to media reports, on March 17, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, A. Grushko, said that Russia would insist on "ironclad" security guarantees as part of any ceasefire deal to end the conflict in Ukraine. From the Kremlin's perspective, granting Ukraine security guarantees without including Russia was to continue to deem Moscow as an "enemy" and leave its security uncertain. Mr. Grushko had basically echoed the Kremlin's call for "ironclad guarantees" that Ukraine would not join NATO, which were spelled out as Russia's top priority in the eight-points list of demands issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 2021, in the run-up to the start of the war. However, that was not the first time when Moscow had asked for security guarantees from the West. When D. Medvedev took over as Russia's president in 2008, he offered the West a new pan-European security deal that included Ukraine and that, ironically, would have prevented the Russian invasion if it had been adopted. (<https://intellinews.com>) Consequently, as @EGF_Brussels has recently posted on X: *"From a Russian perspective, war in Ukraine has been about getting Western security guarantees. To win the peace, president Trump must get agreement on a set of security guarantees that should be satisfactory for Moscow, Kyiv and Europe. That is a new European*

security deal." Consequently, another key task for New Europe would be to start developing a new vision on what that new European security deal might entail.

In conclusion, New Europe should consider opening their own (secret?) negotiations with Russia on re-casting the European security structure in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. That would most likely draw US attention, while bringing the Europeans closer to Washington's European power play.

On the other hand, the biggest problem for Ukraine is that president D. Trump cares little about the security implications of accepting most of the Russian conditions for a ceasefire, and a subsequent peace agreement. What matters for him is having mediated a deal with minimal costs for the US. He might walk away from the self-imposed mediation role if he realised that he couldn't get it. The US leaving the war in Ukraine to end upon its military outcome would be a disaster for both Europe and Ukraine. If that happened, not only that the war might be further escalated by a largely unconstrained Russia, but the ongoing crisis in European affairs might turn to despair, and the possible expansion of war towards neighbouring Moldova, and the smaller Baltic states could not be excluded.

The best ways for New Europe to mitigate the consequences of the current crisis in European affairs would entail following on the US-lead in negotiations with Russia over the war in Ukraine and opening up to discuss a new European security deal. The alternative to doing so might lead into nothing less than a major war with Russia over Eastern Europe.

2) President Trump's (re-)vision of the world order: transactional hardline Realpolitik?

In our [Issue 24/November 2023-February 2024](#), Item #3, we had anticipated that the outcome of the 2024 presidential elections in the US would be highly consequential on the global arena. At the time, we

had noted a possible turn from the current values-based decision-making to a purely mercurial approach of the delivery of US military support, as well as the geopolitical transformation of the world order entailing a shift in US regional priorities to the Indo-Pacific and Middle East, at the expense of Europe. Both are happening now. However, global, and regional re-alignments following the US-China power dyad has apparently died out.


Surprisingly though, less than 100 days into president D. Trump's second tenure at the White House have revealed a revisionist US approach to the world order, apparently built upon transactional hardline Realpolitik. In early March 2025, R. Haas, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, acknowledged in an interview that the post-WWII world order was on life support. In his view, the future could be a world of much more disorder where US adversaries would see opportunities. *"Could be a world of spheres of influence, where China says, Oh, we're going to do with Taiwan and others what we want, where Russia controls big parts of Europe, while the United States seems to play a more aggressive role in the Western Hemisphere"*. Furthermore, he saw Trump 2.0 as far more radical, and disruptive than the first term: *"we see all these [US] alliance relationships being disrupted. We see an unconditional reaching out to adversaries like Russia. And what we don't see is what the president proposes to put in place of the existing order. It seems to be a world, if you will, without structure, without permanent relationships."* (<https://www.npr.org>)

Along a similar line of thought, A. Younger, a former chief of Britain's foreign intelligence service MI6, was quoted as saying: "We are in a new era where, by and large, international relations aren't going to be determined by rules and multilateral institutions. [...] They're going to be determined by strongmen and deals ... That's Donald Trump's mindset, certainly [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's mindset. It's

[Chinese President] Xi Jinping's mindset." (<https://washingtonpost.com>) This would be the transactional bit of president Trump's emerging worldview. Or as M. Kimmage, director of the Wilson Centre's Kennan Institute, laid out in a recent essay on "The World Trump Wants": *"With Trump in power, conventional wisdom in Ankara, Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington (and many other capitals) will decree that there is no one system and no agreed-on set of rules.[...] In this geopolitical environment, the already tenuous idea of 'the West' will recede even further - and, consequently, so will the status of Europe, which in the post-Cold War era had been Washington's partner in representing 'the Western world'"* (<https://foreignaffairs.com>) And that might be the end of the geopolitical West, an apparent fallout of D. Trump's hardline Realpolitik.

A few political scientists have attempted to make sense of the actions and statements of the newest Trump Administration for outlining some geopolitical patterns in external relations. For example, T. Struye de Swielande suggested in a Commentary Paper on "D. Trump or the Emperor Strikes Back", republished by Egmont Institute, that the new US administration would favour a single form of leadership, i.e. *transactional leadership*. This kind of leadership would be limited to the use of power exclusively through coercion, sanctions, threats and rewards, thus ignoring all other forms of power. In Trump's world, the international environment would be a place of competition targeting control over markets, technologies and resources. Meanwhile, regional and international institutions and organizations, as well as international treaties would get increasingly useless. Struye de Swielande noted a certain continuity in foreign policy with the Biden administration regarding avoiding unnecessary wars, prioritizing competition with China, and pushing Europe to take on more responsibility. However, the Trump Administration would take a different approach

CE Classification of Geopolitical Alignment



Source: Capital Economics via bne Intellinews

when it comes to preventing the strengthening of Iran- Russia- China- North Korea axis. Instead of aiming to build a “coalition of democracies” to weaken and eventually fight against it, president D. Trump has apparently opted for opening a strategic dialogue with Russia, banking on tighter relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, and threatening with military strikes to persuade Iran to revise the nuclear deal he had dropped in 2018. Meanwhile, China should be weakened by a combination of tough economic sanctions and technological restrictions, Washington reaching out to Moscow, and constraining the regional influence of Teheran in the Middle East (policy on North Korea is still to be rolled out).

According to the same expert, Trump’s grand strategy would be characterized by the logic of *offshore balancing*¹ (in the previous issue we referred G. Friedman’s *indirect warfare strategy*, which is an element of the former). The role of the US would be to: maintain dominance over the Western Hemisphere; contain the emergence of a challenger in Europe, the Persian Gulf and Northeast

Asia; reduce military presence on land abroad; stop being the world’s policeman; encourage other countries to assume their responsibilities (burden sharing); intervene only when necessary.

From a geopolitical perspective, Eurasia could become secondary to the US strategic interests, as the Trump administration might bank on a balance of power between Russia, China and the European Union. In the Indo-Pacific, this could mean giving China a sphere of influence in the South China Sea, with the hope that the other countries of the region, Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, would be able to contain Chinese power. President Trump’s geopolitical vision would also include recreating large geopolitical spaces based on the logic of “*living space (Lebensraum)*” developed by Ratzel at the end of the 19th century. This logic would coincide with that of presidents Putin, and Xi, and of prime-minister Modi. Accordingly, each great power should have its own sphere of influence, that should be accepted by the others. D. Trump’s positions on Ukraine and Taiwan should be understood within this reading. All that would ultimately lead to a fragmentation of the world into several regional

¹ Christopher, Layne, « From Predominance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy »,

International Security, 1997, vol. 22, n°1, pp. 86-124.

blocks characterized by different trade, technological and digital standards, payment systems and reserve currencies. While those regional blocs might continue to interact with each other, this would be largely on a transactional basis. (<https://www.egmontinstitute.be>)

On the other hand, in an article on “Trump Has Launched a Second American Revolution. This Time, It’s Against the World” S. Patrick argued that D. Trump was revolutionizing US foreign policy. *“His policies will upend world order by destabilizing and ultimately destroying established institutions and patterns of international cooperation.”* Although in his view there could be no unified theory of Trumpian engagement under a coherent grand strategy, certain recurrent motivations, preferences, and themes could collectively amount to his worldview, as discernible from his administration’s flurry of executive orders and policy pronouncements. S. Patrick identified ten themes of Trumpian foreign policy: an abdication of US leadership and responsibility; a mindset of sovereignty on steroids (i.e. a defensive and distorted interpretation of sovereignty that is sceptical of international organizations and treaties); a denigration of the West - and US alliances; a revival of spheres of influence; a dismissal of international law; a preference for bullying bilateralism; repudiation of economic multilateralism; a disavowal of global development; an abandonment of democracy promotion; a rejection of global public goods. He compared all that with *“a revolution against the world America made”*. The most visible consequence would be many countries hedging against a suddenly unpredictable US. That instinct, which is currently spreading also to America’s closest allies, is raising a key question regarding the reshaping of the multilateral system: *“As the United States embraces aggressive nationalism, will the others (i.e. the EU, China, Russia, and the middle powers, such as India and Brazil) seek to fill the*

vacuum of global leadership, and in pursuit of what priorities?” (<https://carnegieendowment.org>)

Against that backdrop, what could be the potential consequences of president D. Trump’s *“revolution in foreign affairs”* over the emerging world order?

1) First and foremost, it might favour redrawing the geopolitical maps of the world. Most experts agreed that president Trump's global agenda might be built upon three majors: US, China, and Russia, few middle/regional powers, such as India, Turkiye, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Brazil, Europe (still under construction), and an amorphous Global South. This would basically be a new global distribution of power shaping up centred on the US- China- Russia managed hegemony, where they might cooperate on regional power sharing, and compete for markets, technologies, and critical resources, while the others would need to either hedge or submit. That might be a kind of global *“concert of power”* scenario with mutually agreed *“legitimate”* spheres of influence, but also with open geopolitical competition beyond those. As M. Duffy Toft has put it in a recent article on *“The Return of Spheres of Influence: Will Negotiations Over Ukraine Be a New Yalta Conference That Carves Up the World?”*: *“Establishing spheres of influence involves a dominant power abridging the sovereignty of geographically proximate states-as Trump is seeking to do with Canada, Greenland, and Mexico and as China is attempting with Taiwan. A political order based on spheres of influence also relies on other great powers' tacit agreement not to interfere in each other's spheres.”* From this perspective, *“a scenario in which the US, China, and Russia would agree that they had a vital interest in avoiding a nuclear war, acknowledging each other's spheres of influence could serve as a mechanism to deter escalation”*. (<https://foreignaffairs.com>)

2) Some might think that president D. Trump would be trying to peel China and Russia away from

each other, in a sort of “reverse Nixon” strategy. That is by re-opening the strategic dialogue with Moscow, he might hope that Beijing and Moscow would cool down their “no limits” strategic partnership while creating significant leverage for US in relations with both China and Russia. However, this might not work exactly like Nixon-Kissinger policy in the early 1970’s. On the one hand, a smaller US engagement in European security would diminish the threat against Russia from its West, and it would allow Moscow to focus on its Southern periphery, namely the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where it has lost much of its influence since the fall of the Soviet Union, mostly on behalf of China and Turkiye. As K. Bokhari noted in a recent essay on “The Asian Aspect of the US-Russia Détente”, Russia and China are not only strategic partners but also competitors over a shared Eurasian landmass. As its war in Ukraine has shown, Russia is at a slight disadvantage as it is no longer an effective security guarantor, and, crucially, it had no choice but to accept China’s expanding geoeconomic influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That is likely to sharpen the Chinese- Russian regional competition, while creating some leverage to the US, and potentially other regional players (such as Turkiye and India) in rebalancing the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass. He concluded: “Russia cannot beat the United States. But it can lose to China” (e.g. in Eurasia). And that would create an obvious advantage for the US which could be leveraged in the competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. (<https://geopoliticalfutures.com>). On the other hand, in a multipolar world which is run on a transactional basis, Beijing might simply not mind that Washington and Moscow were doing business together, as long as it was not directed specifically against Beijing’s core interests (which is unlikely to happen anytime soon). And *vice versa*, Beijing- Washington deals might not create particular concerns in Moscow. That is the re-opening of the US-Russia strategic dialogue would not significantly affect the China-Russia relationship,

as in a multipolar world (unlike in a bipolar system) every country can do whatever business it likes with anyone it chooses. Nevertheless, “for Putin, ties with the US are a big plus as it goes some way towards reducing his diminutive status in his relations with China.” (<https://intellinews.com>) In conclusion, Russia-China relations might not be affected by US change of tack in relations with Russia.

3) The real geopolitical loser from this new global multipolar bargaining is Europe who has been left to deal, mostly on its own, with a stark military power deficit against Russia and might be forced to cut a deal with Moscow (first of all on Ukraine, as well as on other parts of its Eastern Neighbourhood) in utterly disadvantageous terms (as explained in item #1). As R. Momtaz has put it in a recent article on “In Trump's World, Europeans Need Their Own Sphere of Influence”: “The scales have now tipped in favour of the affirmation of three spheres of influence led by the United States, China, and Russia. Europe's place in this system is at best an afterthought, and at worst up for grabs-and division-between the three.” (<https://carnegieendowment.org>) To avoid a geopolitical disaster, the New Europe (EU, UK, and Turkiye) should stand together when dealing with the US, Russia and China. There is no way for them to continue business as usual with any of the global powers. They need leverage to effectively deal with them. To gain that leverage New Europe should nurture pragmatic multilateralism, including with China, and most of the Global South. In parallel, the EU, UK and Turkiye should better coordinate their regional policies in the European Neighbourhoods, including the Black Sea, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, and the Mediterranean to maximize European regional influence by making effective use of their aggregated economic, technological, military, and soft power. As L. Vinjamuri has recently noted: “The challenge for [European] leaders is how to decipher Trump's intentions. If he is simply using unconventional

tactics to get better access to markets, and stronger, more balanced alliances, [...] conciliation, diplomacy, visits, gifts, and steps to comply with his requests may be a smart response. But if Trump has genuine designs on Canada and Greenland and plans to abandon Taiwan and Ukraine as part of a grand design for a new international order, then US partners and allies should adopt a more strategic but also tougher and longer-term response.” (<https://chathamhouse.org>)

4) Finally, a word on how the so-called Global South could benefit from president Trump’s apparent abandonment of the post-WWII world order. Clearly, some countries in the Global South have been net winners from the shifts in global power over the last two decades. The growing influence of emerging economies, the rise of China as a great power, tensions between the US and its European allies, and increasing great-power competition have given those countries new leverage in global affairs. No wonder that non-Western organizations, such as OPEC+, BRICS+, the African Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ASEAN, and the Gulf Cooperation Council have got increased global and regional attention and support from many in the Global South, first and foremost, the so-called *global swing states*². President Trump’s willingness to jump with the US into a multipolar world order would vindicate many countries in the Global South who had argued for years that the international system needed a more balanced new order, in which the United States had to increasingly eschew the impulsive foreign policy of unipolarity for calculated restraint. As M. Spektor noted in an article on “Rise of the Nonaligned: Who Wins in a Multipolar World?": *“In a fragmented global order marked by competition and pragmatic transactionalism, Trump’s policies could increase the global South’s leverage, enabling it to play great*

powers off one another. [...] But the rising agency of the Global South and the expanding geopolitical consciousness among its peoples have fundamentally altered the dynamics of global power.” (<https://foreignaffairs.com>) His conclusion supports a geopolitical trend formulated in a couple of previous issues suggesting that the West/New Europe needs to dramatically shift its current foreign policy approach to the states of the Global South from prioritizing regime change, spreading democratic values, and coercive diplomacy against so-called “autocracies” towards embracing pragmatic bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation, tailored upon mutually shared interests, with a special priority for the *global swing states*. While the structure and management of the new multipolar world order would become more complex, the risk of stumbling into WWIII and an ensuing nuclear war would be significantly mitigated.

Instead of conclusion, we end up with a question and a sour thought drawn from our recent X posts (@EGF_Brussels): Is president D. Trump a genuine revisionist of the world order or is he merely repositioning the US to maintain a leading global position? There is a risk that he might find out soon that achieving the latter might require becoming the former. Sadly, that might be the end of the geopolitical West. However, on a more positive note, we should also keep in mind Albert Einstein’s famous quote: *“In the midst of every crisis, lies great opportunity”*. Let’s hope the American and European leaders would be smart enough to make good of Einstein’s wisdom.

² Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye, which would seek to increase their influence in

global affairs by cooperating with the US, China, Europe, and Russia, without giving any of them an exclusive commitment.



About EGF

The European Geopolitical Forum (EGF) was established in early 2010 by several independently minded practitioners of European geopolitics, who saw a certain vacuum in the information flow leading into the European geopolitical discussion. EGF is dedicated, therefore, towards the promotion of an objective, Pan-European geopolitical debate incorporating the views of Wider-European opinion shapers rather than simply those from the mainstream European Union (EU) member states. EGF seeks to elaborate upon European decision makers' and other relevant stakeholders' appreciation of European geopolitics by encouraging and effectively expanding the information flow from east to west, from south to north. In order to achieve these objectives, the European Geopolitical Forum was established as an independent internet-based resource, a web-portal which aims to serve as a knowledge hub on Pan-European geopolitics. EGF's strength is in its unique ability to gather a wide range of affiliated experts, the majority of whom originate from the countries in the EU's external neighbourhood, to examine and debate core issues in the Wider-European geopolitical context. Exchange of positions and interactivity between east and west, south and north, is at the heart of the EGF project. Please visit our website for further information at www.gpf-europe.com.

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